Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics by Kaufman, Bruce E
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
UWRG Working Papers Usery Workplace Research Group 
12-1-2011 
Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics 
Bruce E. Kaufman 
Georgia State University, bkaufman@gsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Kaufman, Bruce E., "Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics" (2011). UWRG Working 
Papers. 39. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers/39 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Usery Workplace Research Group at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in UWRG Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
ANDREW  YOUNG SCHOOL
 O F  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S
W.J. Usery Workplace Research Group Paper Series
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics 
 
Bruce E. Kaufman 
Department of Economics and Usery Research Workplace Group  
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
bkaufman@gsu.edu 
January 21, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Some Coasian Problems with Posnerian Law & Economics 
Abstract.  The methodological approaches of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner are compared 
and contrasted with regard to microeconomic theory and its application to law and economics. 
The central divide is whether positive transaction cost requires a major reworking of the core of 
neoclassical price theory (Coase: yes; Posner: no). To provide evidence on this matter, the paper 
examines Posner’s well-know treatise Economic Analysis of Law and, in particular, his use of 
two basic price theory tools (downward sloping demand curve; competitive model of 
demand/supply) for positive and normative analysis of labor markets and labor law. Neither 
construct is found robust with respect to variation in transaction cost. An alternative positive 
transaction cost representation of labor demand and wage determination models also reveals that 
Posner’s conclusions on the efficiency effects of various laws and regulations are not well-
grounded. The conclusion, as Coase put forward in his Nobel address, is that core tools of 
microeconomics are contingent on transaction cost and the institutional structure of production.  
 
Modern law and economics (L&E) is widely acknowledged as originating at the University of 
Chicago. Although a number of people connected with Chicago are recognized for their 
important contributions, undoubtedly two names stand-out as the seminal figures. They are 
Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.   
The literature tends to homogenize Coase and Posner as fellow contributors to a common 
intellectual project, frequently portrayed as application of microeconomic principles to the 
subject of law (e.g., Harrison and Theeuwes 2008: 5-6) . Deidre McCloskey (1997) argues, 
however, that a closer reading of Coase and Posner reveals that they promote two very distinct 
and even antithetical approaches to L&E. She says on this matter (p. 239):   
“law and economics as it has developed in, say Richard Posner’s work and as it has been 
absorbed into the mainstream of economics is not the same things as what might be 
called a ‘Coasean’ approach. Coase and Posner, though often treated as identical, 
represent different views on how to conduct economics.” 
 
The dividing line that separates Coase and Posner, claims McCloskey, turns on their 
different methodological approaches to economics. She begins by describing the Coasian 
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approach as “commonsense empiricism” and the Posnerian approach as “rationalism.” The latter 
is also characterized (following Coase) as “blackboard economics” and the former as “anti-
blackboard economics” (p. 239). On the next page, however, McCloskey moves to a different 
and fundamentally more strategic methodological divide centered on the role of transaction cost 
in economic theory.  
According to McCloskey, on one side of this debate is Coase and a relatively small group 
of Austrians, institutionalists (new and old), and other non-conventional economic thinkers 
(including McCloskey). Their methodological position is that transaction cost (TC) is ubiquitous, 
often substantial-sized, and significantly affects economic behavior; hence, economic theory 
needs to incorporate positive TC as a foundational construct – that is, “from the ground up” (also 
see Williamson 1993). Coase (1992) claims in his Nobel address that doing so will “bring about 
a complete change…. in what is called price theory or microeconomics” (p. 713). McCloskey 
expresses this idea as: “transaction costs push our world unpredictably far from the blackboard 
optimum” (p. 241) – so far, in fact, that Coase (1988) concludes economists and practitioners of 
L&E must “discard the approach at present used” (p. 16).  
On the other side of this methodological fault-line, says McCloskey, are Posner, most 
conventional economic theorists, and the main body of modern L&E scholars. Their position is 
that the theorems and models of standard microeconomics are fruitful abstractions even though 
they rest on an implicit assumption of zero TC. From this perspective, positive TC does not 
invalidate or require major reworking of the core of microeconomic theory; rather, TC is useful 
as a way to extend and generalize this core for a set of issues (e.g., market failure; non-market 
institutions) where imperfect information, cognitive constraints, and incomplete contracts are 
important considerations. In this spirit, Posner (1993) allows that Coase and colleagues “correct 
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neoclassical theory, for example by adding transaction costs to the analytic framework” (p. 78) 
but at the same time asserts, “I reject any suggestion that new institutional economics [positive 
TC economics] ought somehow to displace the rest of microeconomics” (p. 76). Echoing 
Friedman (1953), Posner defends neoclassical price with the observation it can be “a useful tool 
of discovery even if it is unrealistic” and “even though its basic premise [e.g., zero TC] was 
false” (p. 77).    
McCloskey’s portrait of the issues and positions of Coase and Posner may be 
iconoclastically framed in places but the divergence between the two men is most certainly real, 
indicated by the quotations featured above and also a deeper perusal of their respective writings 
on the subject (e.g., Posner 1993; Coase 1993). Further, this debate is not just between two 
individual Chicago L&E scholars but is representative of a much larger and more general divide 
spanning more than a century’s time over the proper weight given in economic theory to the 
deductive a priori method and inductive empiricist method. 
Economists are well-known for having small appetite for methodological disputes, in part 
because they tend to generate more heat than light. The dispute over method between Coase and 
Posner is fundamental, however, to the direction of modern law and economics and bears 
examination as long as the light-to-heat ratio remains well-above unity. This I endeavor to do, in 
part by using concrete examples drawn from economic theory to distinguish Coase vs. Posner. 
Although the position of both authors has pros and cons, the thesis staked-out here is that at the 
end of the day Coase wins the argument.  I illustrate this with what may be considered a case 
study of sorts; that is, examination of Chapters 1 and 11 of Posner’s well-known treatise 
Economic Analysis of Law (1
st
 ed. 1973; 7
th
 ed. 2007). Chapter 1 lays-out in general terms the 
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economic tools Posner uses throughout the book; Chapter 11 applies these tools to the topic of 
employment regulation.  
Consistent with the position taken by Coase, I demonstrate that: (1) core concepts of 
standard microeconomics are not robust with respect to variation in transaction cost; (2) Posner’s 
approach to theorizing L&E therefore lacks a solid micro-foundation (certainly for labor 
markets); and (3) for this reason many of Posner’s policy conclusions on labor and employment 
are poorly grounded in theory. As indicated, these propositions are developed for one sector of 
the economy – labor markets – and for one area of L&E – labor and employment law, although 
certain parts (but not all) generalize to other areas of economic analysis.  
Posner, Price Theory, and L&E 
Posner’s colleague at Chicago, Gary Becker, identifies an “economic approach” to studying 
human behavior based on the three pillars of maximizing behavior, stable preferences and market 
equilibrium (Becker 1976). The first two components yield the economist’s model of the rational 
actor. Becker generalizes the concept of “market” to all mechanisms that sort, allocate and 
coordinate scarce resources (e.g., a marriage market) and argues that rational behavior guided by 
money and shadow prices and operating within the constraints posed by given institutional 
structures and resource limitations (e.g., imperfect information) yields efficient equilibrium 
outcomes (also see Lazear 2000). In the spirit of economic imperialism, Becker concludes, “I 
have come to the conclusion that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is 
applicable to all human behavior” (p. 8). 
Posner takes Becker’s economic approach and applies it to the legal field, as indicated in 
the citation to Becker in the first footnote of Chapter 1 of Economic Analysis of Law (2007: 3). 
His valuable and insightful contribution is to treat laws and regulations as additional sources of 
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optimization constraint and relative price variation (often in the form of opportunity cost 
differentials) and to work out the consequences for human behavior and economic efficiency.  
Posner tells readers in the Preface that “The explication of economics in this book 
stresses the unity, simplicity and power, but also the subtlety of economic principles” (p. xxi).  
These economic principles are then outlined in Chapter 1 in the first section titled “Fundamental 
Concepts” (p. 3). Included are the core elements of conventional microeconomic theory, such as 
rational utility maximizing behavior, opportunity cost, the law of demand, demand and supply 
analysis, competitive equilibrium, and efficiency. The Coase Theorem is also introduced but in 
the context of its implications when transaction cost is zero (p. 7).  
The grounding of Posnerian-style L&E in standard microeconomic price theory is 
indicated by the first two diagrams featured in the book. They are reproduced here as Figure 1 
panels (a) and (b), respectively.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The first diagram depicts a downward sloping demand curve. It is featured by Posner as 
the first diagram because the curve illustrates the most fundamental behavioral relation driving 
modern L&E. This relation is the law of demand and associated principle of substitution; that is, 
price and quantity demanded are ceteris paribus inversely related. In introducing the demand 
curve, Posner tells readers, “The concept of man as a rational utility maximize implies that 
people respond to incentives” (p. 4) and then demonstrates in the next paragraph with the 
demand curve diagram how they respond in a predictable way to incentives. That is, if the price 
(money or shadow) of some scarce good goes up people on average consume less of it and 
substitute toward some now-cheaper alternative. The example Posner uses to illustrate the 
application of the Law of Demand to legal analysis is the quantity of criminal behavior in 
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society. If the price of committing criminal acts is increased by stiffer jail sentences, L&E 
predicts that fewer people will commit crimes (ceteris paribus).         
The second diagram in the book is the demand/supply (DS) curve model, shown in panel 
(b). It is featured second because the point of competitive equilibrium establishes the benchmark 
level of prices for the demand curve diagram in panel (a) and the benchmark level of efficiency 
(maximum) for welfare comparisons among alternative policies and legal regimes. The 
mechanics of price determination are only lightly touched on by Posner. Instead, the diagram is 
used to emphasize that competition via DS leads to an equilibrium where prices are equal to 
opportunity costs (on the margin); through the exchange process resources tend to gravitate 
toward their most valuable use; profit (and incentives more generally) are a magnet drawing 
resources into an activity; and at a competitive equilibrium efficiency is maximized since all 
gains from trade have been exploited. Posner in his discussion of how competition guides 
resources to their most valuable brings in the Coase theorem; McCloskey claims, however, that 
in this zero TC rendition the proposition “is actually Adam Smith’s theorem” (p. 240).  
 
Theory Applied: Regulation of the Employment Relationship 
Posner takes these theoretical tools of standard microeconomics and applies them to analysis of 
more than two dozen separate topic areas in law. The area I focus on is the labor market and 
L&E analysis of employment regulation (Chapter 11). Posner defines the domain of employment 
regulation broadly to include both individual and collective dimensions, such as regulation of 
individual termination and company-union collective bargaining. These two areas are sometimes 
separately distinguished as, respectively, employment law and labor law.   
8 
 
I have gone through Chapter 11 and culled-out eight representative propositions and 
conclusions. In each case I give partial or full quotation in order to ensure that this list closely 
reflects what Posner has written. The purpose of this list is to make or reinforce certain points 
about L&E that become the object of Coasean critique in the next section.   
 Labor markets are broadly competitive in nature since “labor monopsony…. is not a 
serious problem in this country” (p. 342) and “monopolies and cartels carry within 
them the seeds of their own destruction” (p. 343). Even where competition is not fully 
effective due to imperfect information or other frictions, one can nonetheless presume 
that labor outcomes are (mostly) efficient because otherwise unexploited gains from 
trade “would be negotiated voluntarily” (p. 349). The base-line for analysis, therefore, 
is “an efficient common law of labor relations” (p. 341).  
 Unions act as a labor cartel and win higher wages for their members but at the cost of 
economic inefficiency and “reduction in the demand for labor caused by union wage 
scales” (p. 343). The National Labor Relations Act “is a kind of reverse Sherman Act, 
designed to encourage cartelization of labor markets” (p. 344). 
 Workers were not victimized by early 20th century “yellow-dog contracts” (a 
provision that says a worker agrees as a condition of employment to refrain from 
joining a labor union) because in a competitive labor market “the worker presumably 
would demand compensation for giving up his right to join a union” (p. 341).   
 “Further evidence that job security is inefficient is that ….employment-at-will is the 
normal form of work contract in the United States. The worker can quit when he 
wants… An employer who gets a reputation for arbitrarily discharging employees 
will have to pay new employees a premium…” (p. 348). 
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 A legal minimum wage “reinforces the effect of unionization on wage rates” (p. 352) 
and thus represents another form of monopoly influence in labor markets; it also is 
ineffective in poverty reduction and most harms the job prospects of  the workers who 
are most disadvantaged (e.g., black teenagers).  
 “The Occupational Safety and Health Act …. is arguably superfluous. The employer 
has a selfish interest in providing the optimal…. level of worker health and safety” (p. 
354). 
 Women’s lower wages relative to men are mostly due to their different human capital 
and occupational choice decisions, made in light of different family roles and 
preferences. These differences “would have narrowed even without government 
intervention” and “not all employment discrimination on grounds of sex is 
inefficient.” (p. 357).  
 Pension protection may well not be necessary because (in part) “[t]he employer’s 
incentive to abuse the power that incomplete vesting conferred on him by reneging on 
his unwritten contract to deal fairly with his employees would be held in check by his 
concern for preserving a reputation for fair dealing” (p. 363-64).  
 
This list is useful because it illustrates three noteworthy features of Posner’s style of 
economic reasoning applied to law that are distinctly non-Coasean.  
  The first is the universality premise of L&E and its underlying paradigm of economic 
imperialism. That is, the methodological presumption is that the standard tools of 
microeconomics and, in particular, the two diagrams featured in Figure 1 (the downward sloping 
labor demand curve; competitive price determination by demand and supply) are in principle 
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applicable to all areas of human behavior, including labor markets and employment 
relationships. This premise differentiates modern (Posnerian) L&E not only from Coase but from 
traditional labor and employment law and the institutional type of economics it is based on. That 
is, modern L&E treats labor markets as akin to other markets except for second-order “details,” 
per Posner’s use of the DS diagram to analyze a minimum wage (p. 352). Traditional 
labor/employment law, on the other hand, maintains labor markets are first-order unique and 
non-competitive institutions because of the human nature of labor and long-term nature of the 
employment relationship; not surprisingly, therefore, they typically do not use a DS diagram in 
discussions of the minimum wage.  
  The second feature of this list is it reveals Posner’s consistent application of the price 
theory principles developed in Chapter 1 to analysis of labor and employment law. The law of 
demand and downward sloping labor demand curve in Figure 1 are explicit or implicit in 
Posner’s analysis of each item listed above. That is, every employment regulation or workers’ 
organization with “bite” raises the effective price of labor (either directly through a higher labor 
compensation or indirectly though lower productivity) and therefore leads (ceteris paribus) to a 
contraction of employment opportunities. Thus, unions, minimum wages, employment security 
provisions, and equal opportunity legislation have a backfire effect (e.g., pp. 353, 357) since they 
hurt some of the target group they are meant to help (e.g., black teenagers or working mothers 
priced out of jobs). With regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act ADA), for example, 
Posner asserts, “The goal is to increase employment opportunities for disabled persons; yet the 
actual effect has been to reduce the number of disabled persons who are employed” (p. 361).  
One reads the list of items above and also sees the competitive model of labor markets 
and DS theory of wage determination in Figure 1 heavily represented. For example, the 
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competitive-based theory of compensating wage differentials (from Adam Smith) figures 
prominently in many of Posner’s evaluations of labor law. According to Posner, banning yellow-
dog contracts or mandating maternity benefits neglects the fact that in competitive markets 
workers get the cash-value of these rights in the form of higher wages; likewise, employers are 
refrained from unfairly firing workers since they will develop a reputation as a bad employer and 
have to pay a higher wage to attract workers. More explicitly, Posner uses the competitive model 
of demand/supply to analyze and evaluate a minimum wage law.  
Equally important, the model of competitive labor markets – augmented where necessary 
by appeal to the Coase theorem (for competitive-like solutions to bilateral monopoly, 
externalities and other market imperfections) and the wealth maximizing tendency of the 
common law – provides the foundation for Posner’s argument that observed employment 
outcomes are on prima facie grounds (typically) a first approximation to an efficient outcome. 
The reasoning is that if outcomes are not efficient then there is, in effect, “money left on the 
table” and where competition is present these rents will be whittled down until all gains from 
trade are exhausted (p. 10).  
Because Posnerian L&E assumes as a base-line proposition that resources are (more or 
less) efficiently ordered, it follows as a matter of logic that a labor law or employment regulation 
enters the scene as “guilty until proven innocent.” That is, if the analysis starts out with “assume 
a competitive labor market” and “assume an efficient regime of common law,” it is a an easy and 
non-controversial step to draw a DS diagram of labor markets (e.g., Posner’s Figure 11. 2), 
locate the status quo as the competitive equilibrium, and demonstrate that every labor law and 
employment regulation listed above is destructive of social wealth. The guilty verdict may be 
swung to innocent but the onus is on proponents of regulation to make this case; in particular, 
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they must demonstrate compelling evidence of significant and persistent market failure and 
inability of private bargaining (the Coase theorem) to solve the (alleged) problem.   
Posner’s default “guilty until proven innocent” position on employment regulation is 
illustrated in his analysis of employment at will. Two options are considered: first, employment 
at will (no restriction on hire and fire) and, second, a just-cause termination mandate (fire only 
for demonstrated good cause). The thrust of his argument is in favor of the “no regulation” 
option; he observes, for example, that hire and fire promotes labor market flexibility while 
workers’ interests are adequately protected by competitive market forces and employers’ self-
interest in keeping a productive workforce. Thus, he concludes, “it is difficult to see how 
workers in general can benefit from such a requirement (p. 349) – a logical deduction if 
competition has already led employers and workers to the contract curve (or close thereto).  
The third noteworthy feature of this list of labor law conclusions is that while Posner’s 
evaluation is in each case negative (i.e., “free market”) he nonetheless asserts that they are the 
joint product of value-neutral (aka, scientific) tools of microeconomic theory and a widely 
accepted welfare criterion. On one hand, L&E is avowedly normative because practitioners such 
as Posner purposefully use economic analysis to evaluate the welfare effects of law and 
regulation and derive policy conclusions and recommendations therefrom. Yet, on the other 
hand, Posner rebuts critics who assert L&E has (in his words) a “conservative bias” (p. 26). He 
asserts that the microeconomic tools used in L&E are “ideologically neutral or balanced” (p. 27) 
and the L&E welfare criterion of wealth maximization asserts no more than “in a world of scarce 
resources waste should be regarded as immoral” (p. 27).  
Interestingly, Coase does not object to many/most of the normative free market 
implications Posner derives with the help of modern microeconomics because he, like Posner, is 
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a proponent of economic liberalism. But at the level of theory, McCloskey is correct to argue that 
Posner’s approach to L&E has much greater affinity with Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand 
theorem of Arrow and Debreu than Coase’s positive TC institutional approach to law and 
economics. The ramifications of this divide for economic analysis of law are next highlighted.  
 
The Consequences of Positive Transaction Cost: Theory and Policy 
Coase and Posner broadly agree on several points. One is the definition of transaction cost (see 
Benham and Benham 2010 for a general review). Coase (1937) started out defining TC (he did 
not, however, use this exact term) as “costs of using the price mechanism” and later expressed 
this idea as “costs of contracting” (1991: 73). Posner (2007) defines TC in a similar way; that is, 
“costs of effecting a transfer of rights” (p. 34).  
The two men also agree that transaction cost are always positive and sometimes high.  
Coase (1992) says in his Nobel lecture transaction costs “are pervasive in the economy” while 
Posner (2007) states, “transaction costs are never zero; in fact they may be quite high” (p. 51). 
Where they fundamentally disagree is on the consequences of positive transaction cost 
for theory and legal analysis. Based on the foregoing review, I assert that the main 
methodological issues separating Coase and Posner may be framed as these two complementary 
hypotheses (with Posner’s position taken as the null and Coase’s as the rejection of the null).   
 H1: incorporation of positive TC does not affect in a substantively significant way 
either the theoretical structure or predictive content of standard microeconomic 
theory, say as represented by the two panels of Figure 1. 
 H2: incorporation of positive TC does not affect in a substantively significant way the 
positive predictions and normative welfare conclusions of modern L&E regarding 
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alternative laws and policy regimes, say as represented by the labor and employment 
law propositions listed above.  
Each hypothesis is separately examined, starting with H1. 
Theory. Hypothesis H1 asserts that variation in TC from zero to positive does not 
compromise the logical integrity and predictive content of basic microeconomic tools, such as 
the downward sloping demand curve and competitive DS diagram. Coasean logic indicates this 
hypothesis is false, and substantively so, for the case of labor markets. The reason is also 
Coasean – variation in TC from zero to positive fundamentally changes the institutional structure 
of production and, therefore, the nature of labor demand and the market for labor services. 
 The neoclassical labor demand curve and competitive labor market diagram are derived 
with the taken-for-granted assumption that the economy has a factor market for labor services 
and capitalist employment relationship. In Chapter 11, for example, Posner draws a DS diagram 
with the wage rate (W) on the vertical axis and quantity of labor (L), measured as either hours or 
people, on the horizontal axis. The demand curve shows (ceteris paribus) how many 
hours/people firms want to hire from the labor market at various market wage rates; the DS 
diagram shows how competitive bidding in the labor market between labor demanders 
(employers) and labor suppliers (would-be employees) determines an equilibrium price and 
quantity of labor services. This equilibrium is an efficient outcome, as earlier described. 
The problem for Posner and neoclassical economics is that both diagrams have no logical 
existence with either zero or positive TC (i.e., they are not robust to TC period). If TC is zero, 
Coase demonstrates that the institutional structure of production disaggregates (dis-
agglomerates) to its lowest level of decentralization. The reason is that coordination of the 
division of labor (e.g., the separate tasks required to produce Adam Smith’s pins) can be 
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performed by two modes – price and competition in markets and command and administration in 
organizations (e.g., firms) – and if TC = 0 then market coordination is everywhere favored. 
Demsetz (1991) calls this institutional structure of production “perfect decentralization” and says 
in this economy “each individual acts as a firm, selling the output of his effort to other 
individuals acting in a similar fashion” (p. 162).  
The implication of perfect decentralization is that all firms are single-person 
proprietorships (independent contractors, etc.) and buy/sell the intermediate goods needed at the 
various positions in the division of labor though product market transactions. The firms may be 
large agglomerations of capital and workers but the workers provide their services, not as 
employees of (say) Ford Motor, but as John Jones Windshield Installation, Inc. and Nancy Smith 
Rent-a-Marketing Executive, Corp.   
The logical implications for both parts of Figure 1 are dire. Specifically, with zero TC the 
institutional structure of production is such that: (1) firms do not have employees (as that term is 
understood in the law); (2) accordingly, firms have no demand curve for labor (in the factor 
market sense) and panel (a) is thus an empty space; and (3) the DS diagram in panel (b) also 
disappears since firms do not compensate labor with a rental rate per time period (a “wage”), 
they have no demand curve for employees so one of the Marshallian blades is missing, and there 
is no factor market so the supply curve of labor transposes to a product market DS diagram.  
Neoclassical economics is built on a zero TC foundation and what the above 
demonstrates is that in this situation an economy has no labor market, employment relationship, 
labor demand curve, or demand/supply model of wage determination. The tools in Figure 1 are 
still applicable to product markets and the associated legal topics in Posner’s book but they are 
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not scientifically grounded logical abstractions for labor and, therefore, for the evaluation of 
labor and employment law in Chapter 11.  
Posner may retort that this demonstration is perhaps interesting but also a straw man 
since it rests on a pure Walrasian TC =0 model when (per a previous quotation) he adopts a more 
elastic version of neoclassical theory in Economic Analysis of Law that makes room for TC > 0 
(e.g., limited information, bounded rationality). That is, one could surely argue that the labor 
demand curve and DS model of labor markets remain viable and useful abstractions even if (say) 
employers do not have perfect information and workers cannot compute all alternative outcomes; 
to maintain otherwise is to (purportedly) make the dissenter’s mistake of discarding 
microeconomic theory because its fails the test of realism.  
The counter-response is that the critical flaw is not lack of realism but lack of good logic. 
This is a more serious charge against any theory given that the essence of a theory is a logical 
chain of cause-effect reasoning. To appreciate this, consider the alternative case of a TC > 0 
economy.  It turns out that both diagrams in Figure 1 again disappear.  
By wide agreement, imperfect information and limited human cognitive ability are 
central to generating positive transaction cost. Positive transaction cost, in turn, means 
buying/selling in markets consumes scarce resources and creates incomplete contracts. A 
consequence of TC > 0 is that it becomes economical to shift some of the coordination of the 
division of labor inside firms (i.e., “make” replaces “buy”) and have the visible hand of 
management replace the invisible hand of the market. Management coordination, however, 
requires that one or more people in the organization have power and authority to direct/control 
the performance of others. Under a common law legal code, managers to do not have this 
authority with contractors; they do have it, however, with employees. When TC = 0 controls 
17 
 
rights have zero economic value since the environment is fully known and buyers/sellers can 
write complete contracts; as TC grows, however, future events become more uncertain, contract 
incompleteness expands, and gaining control rights to direct labor by converting contractors to 
employees takes on greater value. The upshot is that with TC > 0 the institutional structure of 
production starts to agglomerate, multi-person firms appear, these firms obtain labor services by 
hiring employees, the economy forms a specialized factor market for labor where buyers and 
sellers interact, and out of this interaction is established a rate of pay (wage) and level of 
employment.  
On a surface level a positive TC economy appears consistent with the microeconomic 
models in Figure 1 and the Posnerian position; that is, firms have a demand for labor and the 
economy has a labor market with many buyers and sellers. Figure 1 gives abstract 
representations of both realities. The problem, however, is with the nature of these 
representations. In particular, with positive transaction cost neither labor demand nor wage 
determination take the form represented in Figure 1.  
The key consideration is the incomplete nature of labor contracts. Because of bounded 
rationality and costly information, labor contracts cannot specify every task and performance 
standard and, hence, have large gaps that are filled-in as the production process unfolds. Further, 
positive TC creates frictions and interdependencies (e.g., types of asset specificity emphasized 
by Williamson (1985)) that create an incentive for firms and workers to replace spot contracting 
with longer-term relational contracting. Entrepreneurs, therefore, find it is more economical 
(ceteris paribus) to re-hire incumbent employees (insiders) rather than replace them with new 
hires from the external labor market (outsiders). Also, since labor is embodied in people, work 
effort is volitional and entrepreneurs find they can get more of it by investing (up to some point) 
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in job security, promotion systems, dispute resolution programs, and other accoutrements of 
internal employment systems.  
For these and other reasons, insiders and outsiders in firms are not perfect substitutes.  
Given this, then both the labor demand curve and DS curves in Figure 1 change shape. If 
workers are not homogeneous, the labor supply curve to the firm becomes upward sloping as at 
any given wage some workers are preferred over others.  Also, firms acquire some degree of 
independent wage-setting ability when labor has some element of immobility. The labor market, 
therefore, transitions from competitive to imperfectly competitive with some non-zero element of 
monopsony. Just as the marginal cost curve no longer yields a well-defined product supply curve 
for a firm in an imperfectly competitive output market (e.g., a monopolist), by similar reasoning 
the marginal revenue product curve no longer yields a well-defined labor demand curve for a 
firm (e.g., a monopsonist) in an imperfectly competitive labor market (Fleisher and Kniesner 
1980: 198). Hence, with TC > 0 the conclusion is that the neoclassical labor demand curve in 
panel (a) does not have logical existence and, as it disappears, so does one blade of the DS model 
in panel (b). Without a well-defined labor demand curve in panel (b), the wage determination 
process has to be closed with some other device, such as management “take it or leave it” wage 
offers in labor markets having more job seekers than job vacancies.   
To summarize, Coase’s claim (earlier quoted) is that inclusion of transaction cost “will 
bring about a complete change …. in what is called price theory or microeconomics.” The notion 
of what comprises “complete change” surely varies among economists but, arguably, the above 
may qualify as an example. That is, when transaction cost is brought into the standard price 
theory model of labor markets its two most fundamental tools – the downwards sloping labor 
demand curve and the competitive model DS wage determination – do not survive as well-
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defined logical constructs. Equally significant, by transaction cost reasoning the entire concept of 
a competitive labor market turns out to be a logical non sequitur and, accordingly, one concludes 
labor markets are always and everywhere imperfectly competitive.  
If logical congruence was the sole test of a theory, at least for Chapter 11 Posner would 
have to replace the two diagrams in Figure 1 with alternative constructions. One candidate for 
panel (b) is a monopsony labor market diagram, perhaps broadly interpreted as representing 
monopsonistic competition or some variant. Thus, in this new set-up there are still buyers and 
sellers of labor who interact in markets; what changes is the institutional structure of the market, 
the nature and balance of the competitive process, the predicted level of wages and other terms 
and conditions of employment, and their welfare properties. Likewise, we know from previous 
research by Becker (1962) that due to the elemental existence of scarcity and budget constraints 
there must exist at some broad level an inverse relation between price and quantity demanded. 
Instead of a well-defined monotonic relationship, however, Coasean reasoning suggests labor 
demand curves have some indeterminacy and perhaps an upward sloping segment (because for 
any given wage W and employment level L there are a range of possible marginal products due 
to volitional effort and incomplete contracts). One way to represent this is to replace the pencil-
thin demand curve in panel (a) with a broad shaded band.   
For a person committed to an instrumentalist methodology, as Posner so indicates, these 
arguments based on logic are not determinative; rather, the ultimate test of the utility of a theory 
is its predictive ability. Although I cannot here go into a detailed analysis of empirical research 
on labor markets, let me suggest that here too the evidence is likely to support Coase more than 
Posner.  Two examples are illustrative. 
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Regarding the competitive model of labor markets in panel (b), Ashenfelter, Farber and 
Ransom (2010) summarize a symposium of empirical papers on labor markets and wage 
determination published in the Journal of Labor Economics. They conclude (p. 208-09),  
“The remarkable common feature of all the studies reported here is the high ‘monopsony 
power’ implied by the firm-level estimates of labor supply…. In general, if exploited by 
employers, such high rates of monopsony power imply large welfare losses to society 
through the misallocation of labor and considerable redistribution of income away from 
workers and to residual claimants…. The articles in this issue provide remarkable 
evidence that labor markets are far from competitive.” 
 
  Regarding the neoclassical labor demand curve in panel (a), Doucouliagos and Stanley 
(2009) do a meta-analysis of 1,474 estimated wage elasticities reported in minimum wage 
studies. They conclude, first, the employment effect is effectively zero – consistent with an 
institutional labor demand “band” but not a negatively-sloped neoclassical labor demand line 
and, second, minimum wage research is skewed by publication bias toward results that favor 
minimum wage critics (i.e., the research has a “conservative bias”). They conclude (p.  422-23): 
“We still find strong evidence of publication selection for significantly negative 
employment elasticities, but no evidence of a meaningful adverse employment effect 
when selection effects are filtered from the research record….If this interpretation were 
true, it implies that the conventional neoclassical labor model is an inadequate 
characterization of the US labor markets (especially the market for teenagers). It also 
implies that other labor market theories, such as those involving oligopolistic or 
monopsonistic competition, or efficiency wages or heterodox models, are more 
appropriate.” 
 
Policy. Hypothesis H2 can be disposed of in shorter fashion. Because of their disparate 
methodological positions, Posner and Coase counsel and practice quite different approaches to 
policy evaluation.   
Posner takes the standard theoretical tools of neoclassical economics, adopts the 
Friedmanite proposition that labor markets can be treated “as if” they are (mostly) competitive, 
and then compares efficiency outcomes before and after adoption of various proposed labor laws 
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and employment regulations. As demonstrated above, the verdict he reaches is “guilty-leaning” 
for each law and regulation put under the microscope. Coase, on the other hand, works from a 
positive TC framework and, hence, all human-constructed institutions – including markets – are 
imperfect. His dictum, therefore, is that the economist cannot decide a policy issue on a priori 
reasoning from an abstract model of a perfect (or quasi-perfect) world but, instead, has to decide 
the matter based on an empirical weighing of benefits and costs. Coase therefore follows 
Demsetz (1969) in claiming that the Posnerian approach commits the “Nirvanna fallacy” -- that 
is, it evaluates law and regulation with a model that presupposes resources are already optimally 
allocated. The high probability of a negative verdict is built into the process.  
 To see if a Coasean approach yields different conclusions, let’s return to the list of labor 
laws and regulations listed above that Posner in his Chapter 11 renders a “mostly guilty” verdict. 
It will be seen that if the neoclassical labor demand line in panel (a) and DS curves in panel (b) 
are replaced with a labor demand band and a monopsony diagram the conclusions on all the 
listed labor laws and regulations immediately shift. That is, where once the guilty verdict was 
more or less foreordained now the verdict is an open question which depends on the strength of 
empirical evidence pro and con.  
For example, consider unions (item #2) and minimum wages (item #5). Posner’s charge 
is that they reduce employment, raise wages above the competitive level, and create a 
deadweight efficiency loss. If the labor demand relationship is a band, both institutions may have 
a zero effect on employment -- particularly for modest-to-moderate wage hikes. In an imperfect 
world, an exogenous increase in labor costs can be offset or absorbed through alternative buffers 
and adjustment channels; for example, managers can tighten up on organizational slack and 
employees can increase work effort. Likewise, if the labor market has a monopsony element then 
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both unions and minimum wages may not only leave employment unaffected but also improve or 
at least not harm efficiency. The case for and against these government interventions, therefore, 
cannot be deduced on a priori theoretical grounds because their effect is a priori indeterminate. 
That is, since both unions and minimum wage laws can be either distortion-creating or 
distortion-reducing, the only neutral way to render a verdict is through a balanced assessment of 
empirical evidence from case to case, albeit with due attention to generalized findings from past 
empirical evidence and the implications/predictions of positive TC theory.  
Or consider mandates that abridge employment at will (item #4) and regulate workplace 
safety and health conditions (item #6). For reasons described in the previous paragraph, these 
regulations may not have the perverse employment backfire effect Posner alleges because firms 
can absorb and offset the increase in costs through other channels. Also, Posner’s main argument 
for why these mandates are unnecessary is because in a competitive labor market demand/supply 
create compensating wage differentials that not only pay workers for the additional risk but also 
motivate employers to provide the efficient level of workplace security and safety. However, in a 
world of asymmetric and costly information, constraints on labor mobility, incomplete contracts 
and consequent incentives for opportunism, and (typically) an excess supply of job seekers, 
compensating wage differentials may be inefficiently low or even non-existent. Accordingly, 
employers often (not always) have a dominant position in labor markets while the markets 
themselves yield wages and conditions below the social optimum because of positive TC 
contracting problems (externalities, public goods, moral hazard, etc.).  
Thus, the case for and against employment at will and safety and health regulation, like 
for unions and minimum wages, cannot be determined on an a priori basis since in a human 
world all alternatives are imperfect. The only viable recourse, therefore, is to examine the weight 
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of empirical evidence. As Coase (1988) states, “Realism of assumptions [TC > 0] forces to 
analyze the world that exists, not some imaginary world that does not” (p. 65). 
 
Conclusion  
Posner criticizes Coase’s position as “disdain for theory” (Posner JEP 205) and “stark rejection 
of the theories and empirical methods of modern economics” (JTISE p. 80). Coase (1993 reply) , 
on the other hand, claims “I do not dislike abstraction…. My aim is to bring into existence and 
economic theory which is solidly based” (p. 97).  
Economists can in good faith come down on either side of this debate – as they have done 
for more than a century. As I have endeavored to demonstrate, however, Posner’s position on 
methodology is not well-grounded on several counts. By this rendering, Coase is not “anti-
theory” but “anti-zero TC theory” – a distinction McCloskey (1997) emphasizes but which 
Posner elides. Likewise, Posner’s position is that taking into account positive TC does not 
endanger the main body of neoclassical theory, including elementary concepts such as demand 
curves and demand/supply diagrams. At least for labor markets, this paper shows that in fact 
these constructs are not invariant to TC and, in fact, have no logical existence in either a TC = 0 
or TC > 0 economy. This finding supports Coase’s institutional position. Finally, this paper also 
shows that the Coase vs. Posner approach to theory-building has large ramifications for the field 
of law and economics and its positive and normative evaluation of law and regulation. The 
Posnerian approach puts much weight on a priori deductive conclusions from neoclassical 
models and thereby predisposes the verdict toward “guilty until proven innocent;” the Coasian 
approach, on the other, hand, opts for an institutional-style of theory where markets (and 
alternatives) are imperfect and the verdict on law and regulation therefore is a priori 
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indeterminate and must be decided on the weight of the evidence pro and con. Such a review is 
outside the bounds of this paper; two suggestive examples, however, support Coase.  
In all such debates, opposing positions typically contain their own insights and truths and 
this paper in no way denies this due to Posner. The paper does maintain, however, that Posner 
substantially overstates the merits of his case and the defects of Coase’s. But, of course, this is 
what a good prosecuting attorney does. Further, Posner appears to have moved somewhat in 
Coase’s direction.  
In 2010, Posner was awarded the “Ronald H. Coase Medal” by the American Law and 
Economics Association. In his published address he considers the lessons of the 2007-2020 
economic crisis and comes to this Coasean conclusion: “We have discovered that economic 
theory is more fragile and provides a less secure basis for understanding economic behavior and 
improving economic policy than we had thought.” Ronald Coase would say “Amen.”      
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Figure 1. Posner’s Two Fundamental Diagrams 
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